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Abstract—We describe a computational model of social norms
based on identifying values that a certain culture finds desirable
such as dignity, generosity and politeness. The model quantifies
these values in the form of Culture-Sanctioned Social Metrics
(CSSMs) and treats social norms as the requirement to maximize
these metrics from the perspective of the self, peers and public.
This model can be used to create realistic social simulations,
to explain or predict human behavior in specific scenarios, or
as a component of robots or agents that need to interact with
humans in specific social-cultural settings. We validate the model
by using it to represent a complex deception scenario and showing
that it can yield non-trivial insights such as the explanation of
apparently irrational human behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many applications where we need to computation-
ally reason about social norms. Agent-based social simulations
that do not account for the norms of the modeled culture will
generate misleading results. Games and interactive narratives
that do not model social norms will have actors behaving
in an unrealistic, brusque way, preventing the “suspension of
disbelief” and hindering the educational mission of “serious
games”. In human-agent or human-robot interaction, an arti-
ficial entity that does not follow the appropriate social norms
can annoy or confuse the human participant, lowering the
quality of the experience or even preventing the successful
conclusion of the interaction.
The traditional way to account for social norms in such
systems is to employ a knowledgeable scenario designer to
carefully script the interaction such that the behaviors account
for social norms. This is a labor intensive process that limits
the number of possible traversals of a given scenario and does
not scale well, as the scripts need to be developed from scratch
for every new scenario.
In this paper, we introduce a general purpose computational
framework for reasoning about social norms. We aim the
model to be general enough that its basic computational engine
to be reusable across arbitrary scenarios. The model should
take into account the fact that social norms are often expressed
in terms of the perceptions of the interaction partners, peers or
public. Furthermore, the model needs to account for different
cultures, as well as situations of cross-cultural interactions.
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We start from the observation that different cultures sanction
certain values as desirable. Our model assumes that these
values can be assigned numerical metrics. Actions taken in
social settings positively or negatively impact these metrics.
The behavior of actors in social scenarios will take into
account the objective to maximize the relevant social metrics
- but naturally, upholding social norms is not the only goal of
the actors.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. We start
with a survey of approaches for modeling social norms from
social sciences, and justify the need for our model by pointing
out that the objective of these models are different from ours
- they aim for a qualitative description of behavior rather than
a generative computational model. We also survey work done
in computational sciences in generating social behaviors.
In the next section of the paper we introduce the compo-
nents of our model. First, we formalize the components of
a social scenario. Second we introduce Culture Sanctioned
Social Metrics (CSSMs), the numerical measures that describe
cultural values. As the evaluation of values by different social
actors depend on the their interpretation of the actions by
other actors, we also introduce a model for the Concrete
Beliefs (CBs) of the actors relevant to the social scenario.
The next section is dedicated to techniques through which we
can represent the changes in CSSMs and CBs.
The final step in proposing a computation model is its
validation. How can we validate a computational model of
social norms? While formal rigor and ease of computational
implementation can be easily verified by construction, vali-
dating a computational model applied to human behavior is
difficult and not subject to analytical proofs. We argue that
the usefulness of computational model can be validated if
we prove its explanatory and predictive power in non-trivial
scenarios. We use the proposed approach to model a real world
social scenario, the Spanish Steps flower selling scam, We
show that our model allows us to explain and predict the
apparently irrational behavior of the participants.
II. RELATED WORK
Many theories developed in the psychological and social
sciences account for social norms in the study of human
behavior as it exists in current or past societies. Some of
these theories aim for qualitative descriptions that facilitate
human understanding, but are difficult to model computa-
tionally. Other theories use quantitative, numerical metrics
to characterize human behavior and are thus closer to our
objective of generating behavior in the presence of social
norms. The quantified concepts differ from model to model.
In the following we will briefly survey models of social
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2norms that emerge from quantitative theories of emotions and
quantitative models of culture.
Models of social norms in theories of emotions
Culture and social norms can affect the emotions of humans
in several ways. In some cases, social norms directly prescribe
emotional reactions, by specifying the ideal affect a person
should try to achieve [40]. More directly, however, all cultures
expect people to have an emotional response towards the
fulfillment or violation of the social norms.
The appraisal theory of emotions, one of the most influential
emotion models in psychology, derives emotions from the
meaning that an individual attaches to an event. This meaning
can often be equated with its adaptive or coping value. There
are several alternative formulations of appraisal theory, giving
slightly different definitions for emotions associated with so-
cial norms. For instance, the Orthony, Clore and Collins theory
of emotion triggering (OCC) [32] introduces the separate class
of attribution emotions that are attached to events that uphold
or violate social norms. On the other hand, the appraisal theory
of Roseman [37] integrates these into a class called self-caused
emotions, which can be positive (pride) or negative (regret,
guilt or shame) function of their instrumentality and control
potential.
Another possible perspective to emotions is the economic
one: Jon Elster associates social norms [12] with rules of
behavior that are not outcome-oriented.
There is a significant body of work on the computational
models of emotions (surveyed, for instance in [22] and [26]).
Some researchers were motivated by the desire to implement
emotional agents or robots, while others had the explicit goal
of building a formal qualitative or quantitative theory. Many,
though not all, of these models implement or are inspired by
the OCC model.
Eliott’s Affective Reasoner [11] used a frame-based repre-
sentation loosely anchored in the OCC theory. It performed
reasoning about emotion generation, action generation from
emotional states as well as backward reasoning from obser-
vations to the likely emotions that generated them. The EMA
architecture of Gratch and Marsella [16] improved this model,
among others with representations for the coping ability of
humans. In EMA, norms are encoded only indirectly as pref-
erences over action outcomes, effectively integrating them into
means-ends reasoning (with the possibility of representing less
desirable means with negative side effects). The Oz project [2],
[25], [35] introduced animated characters that included (among
other components of the OCC model) also simple attribution
emotions with respect to moral beliefs and personal standards
of performance. Examples include “do-not-cause-my-goals-
to-fail” and “help-my-goals-succeed”. The TABASCO agent
architecture [39] put the emotional appraisal at the center of
the agent, with perception and appraisal happening through the
hierarchy of conceptual, schematic and sensory processing, in
its turn generating actions at the conceptual, schematic and
motor levels. El Nasr et al. [10] developed a fuzzy logic
based model of emotions, which scores emotion intensities
based on formulas from [34]. The authors also associate a
reinforcement learning component to the model. For learning
attributive emotions the authors assume that the agent already
has a numerical metric that quantifies the way the norms are
affected by actions, but do not discuss in detail where this
number is acquired from. The SCREAM system [33] was a
scripting tool for creating animated webpage characters with
emotional reactions. An interesting aspect of this model is
that it combines inspiration from the OCC theory with the
representation of social power and social distance from the
Brown and Levinson politeness theory [6]. Adam et al. [1]
used modal logic to formalize large parts of the OCC theory.
This includes a representation of the attribution emotions of
pride / shame and admiration / reproach. These models include
two intensity variables: one for the strength of unit which
describes how much the agent identifies itself with the author
of the action and the expectation deviation which is related to
the difference of the action from what is normally expected
from the agent. The approach, however, does not go into detail
about the modeling of the norm, simply equating it with a
general logical formula φ.
Other researchers studied the emotional aspect of social
norms through psychology experiments or field studies. Kurt
et al [24] discuss a study where two subjects try to reach
an aggrement on a topic they disagree. The 20 minute scene
was split into time intervals were the participant acted in a
pro-social, pro-self or neutral way - it was found that these
time intervals were distributed according to an exponential
distribution, implying that the switching to a new state is
some type of non-Markov process. The authors also captured
the emotional valence assigned by the participant to different
intervals, which was found to follow a random walk pattern.
The impact of emotions and empathy towards a fair or unfair
interaction partner was studied by Klimecki et al [23], by
introducing the Inequality Game. The social behaviors studied
included cooperative or competitive economic choices as well
as nice or derogatory verbal behavior.
Several psychological models had been computationally
implemented. For instance, Orr et al [31] introduced a dynamic
computational model of health behavior (based on a neural
network). In their model, the intention is dynamically con-
structed from both an individual’s pre-existing belief structure
and the beliefs of others in the individual’s social context.
This model is based on reconceptualizing the Theory of Rea-
soned Action [13] as a parallel constraint satisfaction system,
which allowed the use of a neural network for modeling and
prediction.
The difference between public and private behavior, of
interest for our model, had been the subject of several research
studies. For instance, Houser et al. [21] studied the behavior
of children in private and public settings in specially created
games. The study found that children over age 9, who are
typically assumed to exhibit full theory of mind skills, had
been better able to resist selfish impulses in public than in
private settings, while this difference did not exist for children
under 9.
An important aspect of social norms is the degree to which
they are actually followed - an aspect often referred to as the
“tightness” or “looseness” of the culture. Gelfand et al. [15]
3show the results of a study that compares the cultural tightness
or looseness across 33 cultures. Their findings show that there
is a very large variation along this dimension. While [15]
is primarily concerned about nationwide implications - for
instance, whether cultural tightness correlates to historical
events such as wars or economic models, such as agriculture
or hunting-gathering, our perspective is one of prediction of
individual action: a person from a tight culture would be more
likely to follow the prescriptive part of a CSSM compared to
one from a loose culture.
Social norms in theories of politeness and culture
A theory of social and cultural behavior strongly related to
social norms is Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory [6],
which centers around the maintenance of “face” defined as
the public self-image of the adult human. More specifically,
they define the “positive face” that refers to one’s self esteem
and the “negative face” that refers to one’s freedom to act.
While the Brown-Levinson model aims to discover the culture-
independent universals in human communication, it is clear
that their definition of politeness does not necessarily match
the definition of politeness and indeed the desirable behavior
in specific cultures. While indirect speech might help preserve
face, there are cultures where direct speech is considered polite
and desirable. The interpretation of the Brown-Levinson model
in the context of specific cultures is a significant ongoing
research topic [18], [27].
The Brown and Levinson model is often interpreted in
terms of the work of Paul Grice [17] who formulated the
cooperative principle in conversations. According to the four
maxims formulated by Grice, speakers in a collaborative
conversation should be truthful, provide an appropriate amount
of information (not too much, not too little), be relevant and
avoid obscurity of expression. Almost always, the desire to
be polite (in the Brown and Levinson definition) and the
desire to be cooperative (in the sense of Grice’s maxims)
are countervailing forces. For instance, the indirect strategy
is highly polite, but leads to inefficient communication.
Another influential model that specifically aims to quantita-
tively measure cultural differences, is the cultural dimensions
theory of Geert Hofstede [20]. The most recent revision
of the theory considers six quantitative cultural dimensions:
(1) power distance, the acceptance of unequal distribution of
power, (2) individualism versus collectivism, (3) uncertainty
avoidance (4) masculinity versus femininity, a metric mea-
suring the balance between assertiveness and competitiveness
versus a focus on cooperation, human relations and quality of
life, (5) long term versus short term orientation and (6) in-
dulgence versus self-restraint. From the point of view of our
model, social metrics can be associated with one or more of
these dimensions - for instance dignity has relevance to (1)
and (4), while wealth to (5) and (6). Furthermore, Hofstede’s
analysis shows us that even if two cultures define the same
set of social metrics, they might weight these differently in
practical behavior.
Relatively few projects attempted to put these theories
into implemented software. One such example, Miller et al.
[28] describes a software product called the Etiquette Engine
that uses the Brown-Levinson politeness model to assess
the politeness in interactions involving military personnel of
common culture but different rank (such as the interaction
between a corporal and a major). In a follow-up work [29]
the authors create a more complex model that investigates how
culture (as exemplified by Hofstede’s cultural factors) as well
as politeness levels affect the way in which people react to
instructions, commands or requests (“directive compliance”).
Bosse et al. [4] formalizes Damasio’s theory of conscious-
ness [7], where consciousness is built up from the distinct
elements of emotion, feeling and core consciousness, the latter
being defined as the “feeling of a feeling”.
Another approach to modeling social-cultural behavior is
through computational linguistics. For instance, Bramsen et
al. [5] extract social power relationships from the language
used by the speakers, relying on words and features which
can be identified by natural language processing software.
Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al. [8] used computational lin-
guistics to determine the type of politeness strategies (in the
Brown-Levinson sense) used by Wikipedia authors in their
communication logs.
III. A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF SOCIAL NORMS
A. The formal model of a social scenario
In a social scenario, a number of persons participate in
a social interaction following a recognizable template. The
following definition introduces the components of our formal
model.
Definition 1: We call a social scenario S a tuple
{A,α, τ ,S,F ,P}, where:
A = {A1, A2 . . .} is a set of actors. Actors are usually
individual humans, although they can also be groups, au-
tonomous robots or software agents.
α = {α1, α2 . . .} is a set of distinct action types. An action
a is characterized by a(α,A, x1 . . . xn), that is, by the action
type, the performing actor and a list of parameters of arbitrary
length. We denote with a = {a1, a2, . . .} the (not necessarily
discrete) space of all possible actions.
τ ⊂ α is the collection of terminal action types. A
terminal action, for any actor and parametrization, terminates
the scenario (moves it to a terminal state).
S = {S1, S2 . . . } is the (not necessarily discrete) collec-
tion of full states of the scenario.
F is the action impact function F : A× S× a→ S. We
interpret S′ = F(A,S, a) as the new full state of the system
if actor A performs action a(α,A, x1 . . . xn) in state S.
P : A × S → α∗ is the progress function. We interpret
P(A,S) = {αp1, . . . , αpn} as the set of action types available
to actor A in state S. If the actor can perform a certain action
type, it is free to use an arbitrary parametrization of it. If in
a given state no actor can perform any action type, we call it
a terminal state.
While the actions are assumed to always succeed, actions
with stochastic outcomes can be modeled through the usual
game theory technique of a nature actor taking an action after
4the human actor, with the nature actor stochastically either
accomplishing or not the intent of the human actor’s action.
The progress function P : A × S → α∗ had been defined
on the full state space of the scenario S. This space state is
not necessarily discrete and even when it is, its size increases
exponentially with the number of variables describing the
state, with the base of the exponent being the number of
possible values for each variable. For instance, for the Spanish
Steps scenario discussed later in this paper, the number of
possible states has a magnitude of 1020 if the variables are
quantized into 10 groups.
In the following, we introduce a structure that helps us
analyze scenarios by observing that many human interaction
scenarios are progress-segmented, that is, the full states can
be grouped into equivalence classes with regards to the output
of the progress function.
Definition 2: We define P = {P1, P2 . . . Pn} the collection
of a finite number of progress states. A progress state P is
a (not necessarily discrete) collection of full states, such that
S ∈ P ∧ S′ ∈ P ⇒ ∀A P(A,S) = P(A,S′). The progress
state discretization function PSD : S → P maps states to
progress states. We will call the function PR : P × A →
α∗ the reduced progress function and define it as P(A,S) =
PR(A,PSD(S)).
Progress states represent a reduction of the full state space
because each progress state corresponds to multiple full states.
For instance, in a negotiation scenario, all the states where a
deal was reached will be grouped into the same progress state.
There is always a discrete number of progress states while the
full state space can be continuous. Thus, in contrast to P ,
the reduced progress function PR is defined on a discrete and
(usually) small space.
A scenarioS is defined generically over actors: for instance,
in a commercial transaction there is a buyer and a seller actor.
When the scenario actually takes place, the buyer and the seller
will be played by specific social agents, let us say Jack and
Jill. The same social agent might be part of multiple scenarios:
for instance Jack might be a seller in one scenario instance and
the buyer in another. Social agents maintain their own private
state SSA. The state of a given scenario is a superset of the
union of the private states of the social agents playing the
actors. T
The private state of a human social agent includes includes
her memories, as well as the full cognitive, emotional and
physiological state [9]. While this is clearly beyond our
modeling capacity, we also notice that in most situations we
expect our social partners to follow the social norms and
restrain the impact of basic emotions and physiology on their
behavior. Thus, for our model we only consider the subset
of the private state of the social agent composed of (a) the
culture-sanctioned social metrics (b) a small set of beliefs
about concrete facts relevant to the current scenario.
B. Culture-sanctioned social metrics
We define a culture-sanctioned social metric (CSSM) as the
degree to which a social value considered desirable by given
culture is upheld in a given social interaction. We say that a
culture sanctions a metric if (a) provides a name for it (b)
provides an (informal) algorithm for its evaluation (c) expects
its members to continuously evaluate the metric for themselves
and salient persons in their environment and (d) provides rules
of conduct which depend on the metric. Seen like this, CSSMs
are numerical stand-ins for a collection of related social norms.
The CSSMs can be either tangible or intangible. Tangible
metrics such as financial wealth or time spent doing something
can be measured by physical means (although many times they
are only estimated). Intangible metrics, such as politeness,
dignity, hospitality, generosity, piety, “face” or “manliness”
are socially constructed, not directly measurable and depend
on the specific culture. The separation between tangible and
intangible metrics is often fuzzy, because even many tangible
metrics, such as time, are subject to interpretation by the
human agents.
Loosely speaking, we can say that social agents try to
maximize the CSSMs they subscribe to. Nevertheless, actions
might have opposing effects on CSSMs (e.g. actions that
optimize generosity decrease financial wealth).
To be educated in a culture an individual must know not
only the name of the metric, but also the evaluation algorithm
and the rules of conduct associated with it. It is not guaranteed
that a given individual will follow the rules of conduct -
however, he or she will be aware of the rules and their
transgression.
The same name might define different metrics in differ-
ent cultures. For instance, the word “dignity” has different
evaluations and rules of conduct in different English speaking
cultures. The dictionary translation of the word in other
languages, such as “azmat” in Urdu, “pratistha” in Hindi or
“me´lto´sa´g” in Hungarian, can denote even more divergent
CSSMs. This being said, there are many CSSMs that appear in
several cultures in identical or near-identical form. There are
groups of cultures with closely related metrics - for instance
the cultures aligned with the Western European model, the
culture of China and nations influenced by Chinese culture and
the cultures of the Near East and North Africa. In addition,
certain CSSMs are cross-cutting geographical, language and
religious boundaries, such as the striking similarities between
“cultures of honour” in places as far away as the Scottish high-
lands, the Bedouins of the Sahara or the Southern USA [30].
Many rules of conduct associated with CSSMs consider not
only the actor’s own perspective, but also the perspective of
other actors in the scenario. For instance, gestures of politeness
and respect are often enacted such that they are visible to
and noted by not only the direct interaction partner, but also
by third parties. Taking this into consideration, we propose a
model where a specific CSSM is identified by five parameters:
CSSM(C,M,SA,PA,EA), where:
• C is the culture that defines the CSSM and specifies its
rules.
• M is the name of the metric, which is unique in the
given culture (but different cultures might mean different
metrics under the same name).
• SA is the subject agent characterized by the metric.
• PA is the perspective agent, from whose perspective the
5metric is evaluated.
• EA is the estimator agent, who estimates the CSSM.
The intuition about the three agents is as follows: in the
estimation of EA, the agent PA believes that the value of the
metric M for agent SA is equal to CSSM(C,M,SA,PA,EA).
There is no requirement for SA, PA and EA to be all different.
For a CSSM to play a role in a scenario, we need EA to be
cognizant of culture C. In addition, it is necessary for EA to
believe that PA is cognizant of culture C (although this belief
might be incorrect). It is not necessary for SA to be cognizant
of the culture (although whether he is or not might be a factor
in the behavior of other actors). A specific CSSM is always
part of the private state of the estimator agent SEA.
Let us consider several examples.
CSSM(Western,dignity,John,John,John) represents
John’s estimate of his own dignity, in the Western cultural
model. CSSM(Western, politeness,John,Mary,John)
represents John’s estimate about how Mary sees his
politeness. If John cares about Mary’s opinion, he will
adjust his behavior in such a way that Mary’s perspective
will improve. Note that this value might not be identical to
CSSM(Western,politeness,John,Mary,Mary), that is,
Mary’s own opinion about John’s politeness.
For a case of cross-cultural perspective let us consider
the case of Ja´nos, a Hungarian businessman in China,
who publicly admits to a business partner Chen a mis-
take in formulating a purchase order. This will affect
CSSM(Chinese,Face,Ja´nos,Ja´nos,Chen) that is, Chen’s
estimate of Ja´nos’s own estimate of loosing face. In this
context, Chen might not understand why Ja´nos would do
such a thing. What happens here, is that Chen is eval-
uating a CSSM which Ja´nos does not: Ja´nos is not ed-
ucated in Chinese culture, and the concept of “face” as
a metric is not sanctioned in Hungarian culture. Thus
CSSM(Hungarian,Face,Ja´nos,Ja´nos,Ja´nos) is not de-
fined, while CSSM(Chinese, Face,Ja´nos,Ja´nos,Ja´nos),
while defined, it cannot be evaluated by Ja´nos, who does not
know the Chinese culture. Nevertheless, this CSSM can impact
the outcome of the scenario: for instance, Chen might act to
prevent Ja´nos from loosing face, even if Ja´nos is unaware of
this.
C. Concrete beliefs
The evaluation of a CSSM is often conditional on aspects
of the current scenario – an action might break a social norm
in some situations, but be perfectly acceptable in others. Thus,
the behavior of social actors also depends on their beliefs
about certain aspects of the current scenario. For CSSMs
where the subject, perspective and estimator agents are not the
same, this also means conditioning on beliefs about beliefs
of other agents, effectively the theory of mind deployed by
the social agent. Although reasoning about general human
beliefs is notoriously difficult, fortunately, social norms usually
depend only on the circumstances of the scenario, not on the
“deep beliefs” of the participants. We will thus focus on a
very restricted set of beliefs that pertain to simple binary
questions that can be, in principle, unequivocally answered
by an omniscient external observer. Such concrete questions
include: “Is A holding a flower?” or “Are A and B engaged
in a commercial transaction?”.
In contrast to the omniscient external observer, the actors
in the scenario need to work with incomplete knowledge and
limited rationality. We will call concrete beliefs (CBs) the
beliefs maintained by the actors in a scenario with regards
to the answers of concrete questions. We say that a scenario
defines a CB if (a) there is an algorithm that an omniscient
external observer could use to unequivocally answer the ques-
tion underlying the CB (b) the scenario expects at least one
actor to continuously evaluate the CB for himself and other
salient actors in the scenario and (c) the scenario provides
rules of conduct that depend on the CB or the CB affects the
calculation of CSSMs.
The definition of CBs has clear analogies to the definition
of CSSMs, but several important differences exist. First, CBs
do not depend on the culture: while the definition of politeness
varies from culture to culture, the question whether a person
holds a flower or not is decidable without cultural references.
Instead of being tied to the culture, the CBs are tied to a
specific scenario. Another difference is that while CSSMs
represent the social values of a subject actor, e.g. the politeness
of John, the concrete question can refer to any aspect of the
scenario, including inanimate entities (“is it raining?”).
Putting these considerations together, we will identify a
concrete belief with four parameters: CB(SC,BD,PA,EA),
where:
• SC is the scenario instance that specifies the question.
• BD is the description of the belief (normally, through the
associated question).
• PA is the perspective actor, from whose perspective the
belief is evaluated.
• EA is the estimator actor, who performs the estimate and
owns the knowledge.
A number of considerations discussed in the case of CSSMs
are applicable to CBs as well. The CB is always part of the
private state of the estimator actor SEA. Although there is
a requirement for some actors to evaluate specific CBs, this
evaluation might be incomplete or incorrect due to the lack of
information, misunderstanding or cognitive overload.
IV. TRACKING CSSMS AND CBS IN A SOCIAL SCENARIO
The action impact function (AIF) F : A × S × a → S
describes the way in which the state of a scenario instance
evolves under the impact of a specific action performed by an
actor: S′ = F(A,S, a) is the new state of the system if actor
A performs action a(α,A, x1 . . . xn) in state S.
Taking advantage of the fact that we reduced
the state to a collection of CSSMs and CBs
S = {CSSM1, . . . ,CSSMn,CB1, . . . ,CBm} allows us to
split the AIF into a collection of functions, one for each
component of the state:{
CSSM′i = F
CSSM
i (A,S, a)
CB′j = F
CB
j (A,S, a)
(1)
6In order to model concrete examples, we will need to choose
mathematical representations for the CSSM and CB AIFs. In
the following two sections we describe one particular choice
that worked for us given the scenario we aimed to model and
the data we had available: use sums of products of logistic
functions for the CSSM AIFs and the Dempster-Shafer theory
of evidence for the CB updates. Naturally, other choices exist,
and might be more suitable under different circumstances. For
instance, one could use deep neural networks for the CSSM
AIF - if there is sufficient data to train them. For the CB
AIF, another choice would be a hidden Markov model or a
dynamic Bayes network. Recurrent neural networks (LSTM or
GRU based) are another possibility for the CB maintenance,
if sufficient training data is available.
A. CSSM AIFs using sums of products of logistic functions
To create a CSSM AIF we must decide on (a) the subset
of the state relevant for a given CSSM, (b) the shapes of
the AIFs and (c) the parametrized mathematical forms that
can represent these shapes in a convenient way. We have
seen that the state S is composed of the private states of
the participating agents. The update of a CSSM in the form
of CSSMi = CSSM(C,M,SA,PA,EAx) will be kept and
maintained by the estimator actor EAx, and this actor only
has access to the other CSSMs and CBs in its own private
state: CSSM(_,_,_,_,EAx) and CB(_,_,_,EAx). Thus,
FCSSMi will be a numerical function depending only on the
CSSMs and CBs whose estimator agent is the same as the
estimator agent of CSSMi.
Let us now discuss the shapes an AIF would likely take.
Tangible CSSMs like time or money, usually have simple
AIFs. For instance, if an action takes time ta then the action
will add this value to the “time” CSSM. If the action involves
paying the sum of ma dollars, this will decrease the “wealth”
CSSM with the given value.
Things are more complicated for intangible metrics, where
the change can be nonlinearly dependent on multiple factors.
For instance, for the social metric of dignity, many cultures
have a sensibility threshold: they advise to ignore trifling
offenses. Similarly, there is a saturation threshold: a level at
which the offense is so big that further increasing it would
not affect the dignity level. Thus, typical AIF shapes might
contain positive or negative slopes, thresholds and saturation
behaviors, but it will unlikely to involve periodic functions
or multiple local maxima. Furthermore, the change in social
metrics often depends on the beliefs: we are less offended by
the angry voice of the interaction partner if we believe that
her anger is justified.
There are many kinds of mathematical expressions that can
generate such shapes. Our goal is to balance computational
and modeling convenience with the hope of capturing some
of the essential phenomena behind the metrics. Many metrics
closely related to CSSMs are modeled in psychology with
the assumption of certain consumable resources in the human
psyche (see for instance the hypothesis of “ego depletion” [3]).
In some cases, these consumables can be actually identified as
physiological measures such as the blood glucose level [14].
Hagger et al [19] conceptualizes self-control as a limited
resource, whose depletion, for instance, would reduce the
ability to follow dieting rules. Values dependent on depletable
resources are often modeled using the sigmoid shaped logistic
curve f(x) = 1/(1 − e−x). To allow for a more flexible
representation, we start with a version of Richard’s curve [36],
a logistic function parametrized with six intuitive parameters
in the form:
Y (t) = A+
K −A(
1 +Qe−B(t−M)
)1/v (2)
In this formula, A is the lower asymptote, K the upper asymp-
tote, B the growth rate, while v, Q and M are parameters
which affect the location and rate of maximum growth of the
function. The six parameters allow for considerable freedom
in the specification of the shape of the sigmoid function, but
they also provide more detail than the requirements of our
problem domain. Thus, we chose to reduce the number of
parameters by only keeping as variables K for the upper
asymptote, M for the location of largest growth and B for
the growth rate. The other values will be fixed at A = 0 and
Q = v = 1. The intuitive nature of these parameters allow
us to handcraft appropriate function shapes. We will call this
4-parameter function the logistic component of the AIF:
L(x,K,M,B) =
K
1 + e−B(x−M)
(3)
Thus, our representation for the CSSM AIFS will be a sum
of products of logistic functions:
FCSSMi =
∑
k
(∏
l
L(xkl,Kkl,Mkl, Bkl)
)
(4)
where xkl is either the constant 1, an arbitrary parameter of
the action, a CSSM or a CB. The CSSMs and CBs appearing
in the formula must have the same estimator as CSSMi. When
some of the logistic components recur in more than one term,
we will sometimes write an AIF more compactly by factoring
them out. In practice, we found that we need a very small
number of logistic components to achieve the desired shapes
– usually only one or two components per dimension. Figure 1
shows four examples of such function shapes achieved with at
most two logistic component terms: a sigmoid shape, a step
function shape, a linear slope and a multi-plateau shape with
two saturation plateaus.
B. CB AIFs using the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence
CB AIFs update the beliefs held by the evaluator actor
as a result of an action. The Dempster-Shafer [38], [41]
theory of evidence represents belief and confidence levels
in a single computational model. The belief supported by
the accumulated evidence is represented by a mass function
that assigns fractions of a mass of 1.0 to all non-empty
combinations of beliefs. New evidence changes the distribution
of the mass. Using the mass function, the belief in a statement
can be calculated as a value bounded by two intervals, the
belief (or support) and the plausibility. The difference between
these two values represent the uncertainty associated with the
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Fig. 1. Implementing different AIF functions shapes using sums of
logistic components. (a) Sigmoid shape L(x,1,0.5,10) (b) Step-function
shape L(x,1,0.5,1000) (c) Linear growth shape L(x,5,0,0.2) + L(x,-2,-10,100)
(d) Multi-plateau shape L(x,0.3,0.2,20) + L(x,0.7,0.8,20)
belief. In our implementation, the full mass functions are part
of the private state of the estimator agent SEA, however, the
CSSM calculations equate the CB with the support component
of the Dempster-Shafer model.
Let us consider the concrete question “Are A and B engaged
in a commercial transaction?” and let us assume that the
current CB of an agent is represented by the mass distribution
m(true) = 0.4, m(false) = 0.1 and m(true,false) =
0.5. With these settings the Dempster-Shafer values will be
support(true) = 0.4 and plausibility(true) = 0.9, which
implies the CB to be 0.4.
As the concrete questions underlying the CBs are binary,
the CB can be characterized by the mass function values for
m(true) and m(false). As m(∅) = 0 by definition, we
will have m(true or true) = 1−m(true)−m(false).
An evidence arriving in the form of new information re-
ceived from an action performed by an agent other than the
estimator1 or an event will also have a mass function me.
The new belief value will be given by Dempster’s rule of
combination (the conjunctive merge):
m′(A) =
1
1−K
∑
B∩C=A6=∅
m(B) ·me(C) (5)
where A,B,C ∈ {true,false, (true or false)} and
K =
∑
B∩C=∅
m(B) ·me(C) (6)
A special consideration must apply to CBs where the per-
spective or estimator agent is a group agent, such as a crowd.
Naturally, different members of the crowd can hold different
beliefs. One natural way to model this is to consider that each
of the members contribute to the overall mass function with
a fractional mass. For instance, for a crowd of 100 people,
each of them will have a personal mass function where the
masses add up to 0.01. For the group agent representing the
1Actions taken by the estimator agent itself will never impact its own CBs.
As the agent is free to choose its own action, the choice of the action never
represents new information.
crowd, the masses of different beliefs will be the sum of the
individual masses held by the members.
V. VALIDATING THE MODEL: THE SPANISH STEPS FLOWER
SELLING SCAM
The main goal of our proposed computational model of
social norms is to support software implementations for
the modeling and simulation of social systems as well
as to generate behaviors in human-robot or human-agent
systems. The formal model is described in the previ-
ous sections, and a software implementation is available
at https://github.com/NetMoc/CSSM. But the exis-
tence of a formalism and a software implementation does not
guarantee the usefulness of the model. One way to validate
our approach is to show that we can gain non-trivial insights.
In this section we show how our model can explain apparently
irrational human behavior in a complex social scenario.
Let us consider a flower selling scam perpetrated by crooked
sellers at the Spanish Steps in Rome (and probably at many
other popular destinations around the world). The goal of the
seller is to pressure a client (typically a woman or a romantic
couple) to purchase a flower at an inflated price by proceeding
through the following scenario:
• The seller offers a bouquet of flowers to the client. The
client declines to purchase.
• The seller offers a single flower, relying on gestures
implying that it is a gift. If the client refuses to take
the flower, he repeats the offer several times, pushes the
flower into the client’s hands, or inserts it into her bag.
• The seller waits an amount of time at some distance from
the client. During this time, the client gets used to the
received gift, takes a picture with it or puts it in her bag.
• The seller approaches the client and requests payment,
relying on visual signals (rubbing the pointing finger and
thumb together).
• The client repeatedly attempts to return the flower while
the seller refuses to take it. The action concludes by either
the client paying or by escalating her verbal efforts to
return the flower until the seller decides to take it back.
The Spanish Steps flower scam, despite being physically
simple, is based on a series of complex decisions. It is, at its
roots, a negotiated commercial transaction, which, however, is
initiated by a deceit – the implication that the flower is a gift.
The deceit is facilitated by the blocking of the normal channels
of communication – the seller is usually a good speaker of
several languages, but fakes reduced communication ability
to position the deceit as a misunderstanding. The successful
conclusion of the scam relies on the manipulation of the
public perception: the client needs to have the impression that
everybody around believes that she agreed to buy the flower.
Explaining and predicting the behavior of the participants is
not necessarily easy even for the human observer. Why some
clients accept to pay for the flower, well knowing that they
are cheated? Conversely, why does the seller, occasionally,
give up, without pushing the selling process to the extremes?
Neither question can be answered based on the assumption
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Fig. 2. The progress graph of the Spanish Steps scenario.
of a narrowly defined wealth-maximizing rational agent. The
intuitive answer is that a successful seller manipulates the
client to believe that not purchasing the flower would violate
social norms, while a successful client manipulates the seller
to a situation that further pushing the sell would violate its own
social norms. In the following we model this scenario using
our framework to put this intuition on a quantitative basis.
A. Actors, progress graph and action types
The Spanish Steps scenario has three individual actors: the
Seller, Client, Spouse and a group actor, the Crowd. Only
the Seller and the Client take actual actions; the Spouse
and the Crowd influence the outcome by being the perspective
actors in CSSMs and CBs considered by the active actors.
The two active actors can take actions belonging to the 16
action types listed in Figure 2. For some of these actions
we also need to consider the parametrization. α8 and α10
are actions involving verbally and gesturally declining a gift
and attempting to return the flower respectively. They are
parametrized by their “loudness” x that determines how many
onlookers will overhear the transaction and their “offensive-
ness” y that influences how the action impacts the politeness
of the actor and the dignity of the target. For action type
α13, which involves the Seller waiting without taking any
action, the parameter is the length of the wait t. The Spanish
Steps scenario can be represented with the progress state graph
shown in Figure 2, which has 10 non-terminal progress states
and 4 terminal progress states.
The full state space of the scenario, depending on the degree
at which we choose to model the state of the client and the
seller, can be very large. The progress state discretization
function however, groups these states in the 14 progress states.
For instance, progress state S9 represents a situation where the
client had just tried to return the flower. This progress state
groups a large number of possible full states - from states in
which the client is mildly amused to states in which she feels
angry, humiliated, embarrassed at various degrees, as well as
possible combinations of these.
B. CSSMs in the Spanish Steps scenario
The metric of financial wealth is the central concern of
every financial transaction. However, as we have seen, taken by
itself, the assumption of maximizing financial wealth cannot
explain or predict the behavior of the actors in the Spanish
Steps scenario. In the following, we will consider a collection
of CSSMs and CBs that allow us to model the scenario with
explanatory and predictive power.
We will use four CSSMs: two concrete ones (Wealth and
Time) and two intangibles (Dignity and Politeness), all
of them defined in the Western culture.
Wealth: is the sum of the financial wealth of the person,
measured in real-world currency. The social norms associated
with wealth in the western culture encourage users to increase
their own personal wealth. For the Spanish Steps scenario we
assume that the seller and the client each consider only their
own personal wealth2:
CSSM(Western,Wealth,Seller,Seller,Seller)
CSSM(Western,Wealth,Client,Client,Client)
Time: is the amount of time spent in the current scenario
measured in seconds. Western social norms discourage people
from wasting their time (“Time is money”)3. Again, we assume
that the seller and the client only consider their own time spent.
If the seller deals with one client at a time, these values will
be the same:
CSSM(Western,Time,Seller,Seller,Seller) =
CSSM(Western,Time,Client,Client,Client)
Dignity: in Western culture is associated with the degree
of respect the person receives from interaction partners or the
degree of self-respect he shows. Dignity being an intangible
metric, the rules associated with it are more complex. An
insult decreases the dignity of a person. A person will feel
insulted if the communication partner uses rude language, or
if he perceives that he has been lied to. The dignity of a person
is also affected by his own actions: for instance, an excessive
emotional display decreases the dignity of the person. It is
considered undignified to renege on a promise (for instance,
to not fulfill an accepted commercial transaction).
As Western culture requires persons to maintain their
dignity, the metric affects the decisions of the actors in
the scenario. The client evaluates his own dignity from his
own perspective, from the perspective of the spouse and the
perspective of the crowd. These values are also estimated
by the seller. As the seller sees all the relevant actions and
understands Western culture, his estimate of the client’s dignity
will be the same as the client’s own estimate.
Modeling the dignity of the seller presents an interesting
challenge. We might say that the seller, engaged in a deceitful
selling maneuver, does not care about his own dignity or at
2There are scenarios where the estimation of the wealth of the interaction
partner is necessary for accurate modeling: for instance, in a “Giving Money
to a Beggar” scenario.
3As we described CSSMs as values to be maximized, technically the CSSM
would be “saved time” not “elapsed time”.
9least values it much less than financial gain4. Nevertheless,
even if he does not care about his own dignity in the Western
definition of the metric, social pressure obliges him to consider
his dignity from the perspective of the crowd. This value can
also be estimated by the client:
CSSM(Western,Dignity,Seller,Crowd,Seller) =
CSSM(Western,Dignity,Seller,Crowd,Client)
Politeness: for the purposes of this paper, we define
the Politeness CSSM as the degree to which a social actor
adheres to acceptable forms of speech and gesture in specific
circumstances5. Persons are required to maintain a positive
politeness in the perception of the self, as well as from
the perspective of peers and crowd. Due to the low power
distance in Western culture the rules associated with politeness
are comparatively simple, but by no means trivial. A person
decreases his politeness metric if he uses rude language, loud
voice or indecent or threatening gestures. It is considered
impolite to decline a gift or to insist on an issue in the
face of the refusal from the interaction partner. In contrast
to cultures that insist on politeness under any circumstances,
politeness rules in Western culture take into account whether
the interaction partner “deserves” politeness based on his
recent actions. For instance, rude language addressed to a
crooked seller has a smaller impact on the client’s politeness
metric.
The politeness metric is taken into account at several action
choices. The client’s decision to accept the flower in state S4
is influenced by his self perception:
CSSM(Western,Politeness,Client,Client,Client)
At progress states S8 and S9 however, the client knows that
he is being cheated, so his rudeness towards the obviously
crooked seller will not affect his own politeness metric.
However, he still needs to worry about the perception of
the crowd and his spouse who might not consider the seller
crooked:
CSSM(Western,Politeness,Client,Crowd,Client)
CSSM(Western,Politeness,Client,Spouse,Client)
The metric of politeness is also relevant to the seller, who
must care about his own politeness as perceived by the crowd:
CSSM(Western,Politeness,Seller,Crowd,Seller)
This fact is also known by the client, who can approximate
this value with:
CSSM(Western,Politeness,Seller,Crowd,Client)
CBs in the Spanish Steps scenario
The next step is to determine the concrete questions and
associated CBs that influence the behavior of the actors in the
Spanish Steps scenario. We find that we only need to consider
two questions: Q-Gift and Q-Agreed.
4An alternative explanation would be that the seller has a different culture
and thus applies a different metric.
5We are considering here a relatively narrow definition of the politeness of
speech forms and gestures. This is a more restricted and specific interpretation
than, for instance, positive face in politeness theory [6] which tries to account
for a wider range of phenomena across cultures.
Q-Gift: Is the flower a gift?
This question is unequivocally answerable by the seller (he
knows it is not) so we have:
CB(S,Q-Gift,Seller,Seller) = 0
However, the value for the client CB(S,Q-Gift,Client,
Client) has a significant impact on whether he will accept
the flower or not in progress state S3. If the flower is a gift
and he declines it, the client will incur a penalty in politeness.
On the other hand, it is not impolite to decline a commercial
transaction. Accordingly, the seller is interested to ensure that
in state S3 we have a high value for CB(S,Q-Gift,Client,
Seller), a value that approximates the client’s own belief.
The value CB(S,Q-Gift,Client,Client) will be set to 0
at the moment when the seller asks for money.
Let us now move on to the second relevant question:
Q-Agreed: Has a commercial transaction been
agreed upon?
The answer to this question is actually clear for both the
self and reciprocal CBs of the client and the seller, as they
both know that no commercial transaction took place6. Thus
CB(S,Q-Agreed,X,Y) = 0 for all cases where X and Y are
the Seller or Client.
The interesting CB in this case is CB(S,Q-Agreed,Crowd,
Client). If this value is high, the action α10 is per-
ceived by the crowd as reneging an agreed upon trans-
action, while if it is low, they judge it to be a con-
frontation with a crooked seller, with different impacts
on the politeness and dignity CSSMs. The seller must
thus act to bring CB(S,Q-Agreed,Crowd,Client) ≈
CB(S,Q-Agreed,Crowd,Seller) to a high value.
Notice the importance of a passive actor (the crowd) in the
scenario. The Spanish Steps scam would rarely succeed on an
empty street. The presence of the crowd, even without taking
any active action, changes the dynamics of the scenario by
serving as a perspective actor for the dignity and politeness
CSSMs and the CB(S,Q-Agreed,..,..) values.
C. CSSM AIFs in the Spanish Steps scenario
In the following we illustrate some of the representative
CSSM AIFs, moving from simpler to more complex. These
AIFs had been knowledge engineered as follows. We started
with an informal description of the impact in natural language.
Then, we separated the parameters of the action and identified
the ways in which they change the CSSM (step functions,
linear dependency, single or multiple plateaus). For each of
these dependencies we chose appropriate logistic components
as seen in Figure 1, and adjusted the parametrization using
grid search until it matched the natural language description.
Finally, we combined the components to obtain the appropriate
multi-variable AIFs. Considerations of space prevent us from
presenting this process in detail for the individual AIFs.
6As a note, one could imagine a scenario where the client might be confused
whether he had actually agreed to a transaction without really noticing it.
However, this would not normally happen in this scenario: the client knows
that he is being cheated.
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TABLE I
INTUITIVE KEYWORDS FOR CALIBRATING THE PARAMETERS OF ACTION
α10
Value x (loudness) y (rudeness)
0.0 no sound undetectable
0.1 whisper indirect request: hint
0.2 urgent whisper preference
0.3 subdued speech query
0.4 speaking voice direct request: suggestion
0.5 authoritative tone obligation
0.6 loud voice command
0.7 yell generic foul words
0.8 shout targeted offense: eg. ethnic slur
0.9 scream
1.0 shriek threat of physical violence
1) Wealth of the client at α3 (client paying for the flower):
We assume that the cost of the flower is 5C (we do not
model bargaining for the price). Thus, if we denote with
v = CSSM(Western,Wealth,Client,Client,Client)
the value before the action, and with v′ the same value after
the action we have v′ = v−5. Using logistic components this
can be approximated by:
v′ = L(v, 50, 0, 0.08) + L(v,−30,−100, 100) (7)
2) Time of crowd at α13 (wait time t before asking for
money): Naturally, the time passes the same way for all the
actors, independently of perspective. The CSSM of interest
is v = CSSM(Western,Time,Crowd,Client,Seller)=
CSSM(Western,Time,Crowd,Client,Client) because
this is the value that impacts the evolution of the belief of the
crowd that a commercial transaction had been agreed upon
CB(S,Q-Agreed,Crowd,Client).
In this case, we simply add the parameter to the time value
v′ = v + t, approximated by the following LCF expression:
v′ = L(v, 50, 0, 0.08) + L(v,−25 + t,−100, 100) (8)
3) Impact of α10 on the estimated public perception of
client politeness: Action α10 represents the attempt to return
the flower. The action is parametrized by the parameters x
(loudness) and y (rudeness). We calibrate the numerical values
of these parameters on the scale of [0,1] using the keywords in
Table I. We are using common sense values for the loudness7.
The low values of the rudeness parameter (0.0-0.6) are mapped
to the mitigation level of speech. Higher values of rudeness
involve insulting language and threats of physical violence.
Let us now consider the impact of differently param-
eterized α10 actions on the self-perceived politeness of
the client v = CSSM(Western, Politeness, Client,
Crowd, Client).
The perceived politeness can be either increased (for low
values of y) or decreased (for high values of y). A louder
voice can amplify the negative impact of rudeness, but it will
not increase the politeness of mitigated speech. Furthermore,
the impact ∆v will depend on the belief of the crowd with
regards to whether the action involves reneging on an accepted
7Note that, strictly speaking, the loudness can be matched to physically
measurable sound pressure values, but this is less useful in developing the
AIF than the intuitive metrics used here.
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Client,Crowd,Client) function of b and y for a fixed value
of x=0.5
transaction or whether it is the justifiable reproach addressed
to a crooked seller, a value captured in the concrete belief
b =CB(S,Q-Agreed,Crowd,Client). The higher the belief
that a commercial transaction has been agreed upon, the
more negative impact the rudeness of the client will have
on his perceived politeness. If the public perceives the seller
as crooked, the rudeness of the client will be perceived as
justifiable self-defence, and his perception will not suffer. On
the other hand, the positive impact of polite behavior improves
the metric regardless of the value of b (one can be polite with
a crooked seller).
Denoting with v =CSSM(Western,Politeness,Client,
Crowd,Client), we have an AIF that can be modeled with
the following logistic canonical form:
∆v =
(
L(y,−0.8, 0, 15) + L(1, 0.8,−100, 100))·(
L(x, 50, 0, 0.08) + L(1,−25,−100, 100))+
L(y,−1, 0.95, 15) · L(b, 1, 0.65, 8)·(
L(x, 50, 0, 0.08) + L(1,−25, 100, 100))
Figure 3 shows that the evolution of ∆v function of the b
and y values for a fixed value of x = 0.5 indeed matches the
informal description we provided above.
D. CB AIFs in the Spanish Steps scenario
In our model, actions affect the concrete beliefs through the
application of the Dempster-Shafer conjunctive merge between
a belief mass distribution representing the current belief and a
belief mass distribution describing the weight of the evidence.
To correctly track the evolution of the CBs we must associate
a (possibly parameterized) belief mass distribution to every
action.
Table II shows the belief mass distribution of various actions
affecting CB(S,Q-Gift,Client,Client). α5 is the action
of offering the flower as a gift, and it represents a weak
evidence towards Q-Gift being true. α6 is the action of
forcing the flower on the client – this can be interpreted either
as an evidence for Q-Gift, but also towards its opposite. Both
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TABLE II
Mass functions of evidence for CB(S, Q-Gift, Client, Client)
Action {T} {T,F} {F}
α5 (offers gift) 0.3 0.7 0.0
α6 (forces gift) 0.3 0.7 0.0
α13(t) (waits) 0.05 / sec 0.95 / sec 0.0
α14 (requests payment) 0 0.0 1.0
α16 (concedes gift) 1.0 0 0
mass distributions keep significant uncertainty. Depending on
the belief the agent started from, after these actions the client
might still be mostly inclined to believe the flower not to
be a gift. Every second that the seller leaves the client with
the flower without asking for money (action α13) provides
more evidence towards the flower being a gift. Action α14
requesting payment will immediately clarify that the flower is
not a gift, and will reduce the uncertainty to zero. In contrast,
action α16, conceding the gift, will set the CB to 1.0, also
reducing the uncertainty to zero. This action, however, is only
a fictional one, which might be expected by an uninformed
client, but will never be performed by the seller.
E. Case study 1: Successful sell
In the following, we model two real-world scenario in-
stances witnessed on July 6, 2012 at the Spanish Steps, Rome,
Italy.
In the first observed scenario the seller was successful in
selling the flower to a romantic couple. The seller offered the
bouquet to the man (α1), but was declined (α4). Then, the
seller offered a flower to the woman (α5), and she accepted
it. After a waiting time of 15 seconds some distance away
(α13(15)), the seller returned and requested payment from the
man (α14). The client attempted to return the flower, with low
voice and suggestion type mitigation level (α10(0.2, 0.4)). The
seller declined to take back the flower (α11). At this point, the
man accepted to pay (α2) and paid for the flower (α3).
TS α1−−→ S1 α4−−→ S3 α5−−→ S4 α7−−→ S7 α13(15)−−−−−→ S7 α14−−→ S8
α10(0.2,0.4)−−−−−−−→ S9 α11−−→ S8 α2−−→ S10 α3−−→ TP2
What requires explanation in this scenario is the fact that
the client gives in relatively easily, despite the fact that he does
not want the flower (as he tries to return it) and he knows that
he is being cheated. Figure 4 shows the results of tracking this
scenario using our model. For all the graphs, the X axis lists
the actions and their parametrization.
Figure 4-a shows the evolution of the concrete beliefs. The
CB(S,Q-Gift,Client,Client) starts with a zero value,
then it raises to about 0.32 after α5 (the offering of a single
flower). This appears to be sufficient for the client to accept
the flower as a gift. Albeit this value appears to be low, note
that this is the Dempster-Shafer belief value which does not
imply that the client has a 0.68 belief in the fact that the flower
is not a gift - the majority of the remainder of the belief mass
is concentrated in the uncertainty domain {T, F}. The belief
that the flower is a gift will actually climb during the waiting
time of action α13 which means that if the client did not give
back the flower initially, it will be unlikely that he will give
it back during this wait8. The belief that the flower is a gift
plummets to zero once the client is asked for money.
Let use now see the evolution of the client’s estimate of
the crowd’s belief that a transaction had been agreed upon
CB(S,Q-Agreed,Crowd,Client). Q-Agreed only tracks
the existence of an agreement about a transaction – the actual
nature of the transaction changes: up to α14 the client believes
that the transaction had been gift giving, after α14, it is clear
that the transaction is a commercial one.
From an initial value of 0, this CB jumps to a value of
about 0.25 once the client accepts the flower, and gradually
increases as long as the client holds the flower. Whether this is
a good estimate of the crowd’s belief has no relevance to the
scenario as long as the crowd is passive9. In fact, it is quite
likely that the majority of the crowd members did not notice
or follow the transaction.
What is relevant from an explanation and prediction point
of view is the fact that at the moment when the client is asked
for money and makes his attempt to return the flower, this CB
has a relatively high value (about 0.68).
Figures 4-b and 4-c track the evolution of the dignity and
politeness metrics of the client and the seller. Overall, this
particular scenario was a very polite interaction, thus we see
only moderate changes in the politeness values. The dignity of
the client sees somewhat more variation - it initially increases
(when the client believes that his spouse is being honored with
a gift) and then decreases - when he realizes that he is being
cheated. Overall, the client finishes the scenario with quite
high dignity and politeness CSSMs. On the other hand, he
was obviously cheated and suffered a financial loss.
From an explanatory and predictive perspective, the ques-
tion is: why did the client accept to pay for the flower? Could
we have predicted this outcome? To answer this we can now
create a “what would have happened” scenario, where we
follow the observed scenario up to a point, and then change
it to see what would happen if the client makes a different
decision. Figures 4-d and 4-e shows the client’s and seller’s
dignity and politeness in a scenario where, instead of deciding
to pay after the first return attempt, the client escalates his
return attempts using louder and louder voice and increasingly
rude language and gestures. What we see is that this scenario
quickly leads to a catastrophic decay of both the dignity and
the crowd-perspective politeness of the client while the public
politeness and dignity of the seller had been barely impacted.
This asymmetry is due to the fact that the client performs these
acts in public in front of a crowd appearing to believe that he
is reneging an accepted transaction.
The explanation for the client paying is that he could
continue his return efforts only at a very high cost for his
public politeness and dignity while the seller can afford to
8This statement assumes that no other event changes the client’s belief
throughout the wait. We have witnessed scenarios where the client holding
the flower had seen another client being asked for money, and rushed to return
the flower himself, illustrating how actions in one scenario can change CBs
in another. This situation can be modeled by our framework but it is beyond
the scope of the examples considered in this section.
9It is not impossible for the crowd to become an active participant in a
scenario - people might intervene verbally or call the police.
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Fig. 4. Scenario 1 - Successful sell : (a) the evolution of the CBs Q-Gift and Q-Agreed, (b) the politeness and dignity CSSMs of the client, (c) the
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decline the return of the flower with minimal impact to his
public perception.
Similarly, after action α13 our model allows us to predict
that the selling action will be successful, as long as we are
only considering the calculations of CSSMs and assume that
the humans attempt to maximize them. While many people
follow social norms as represented by the CSSMs, some of
them are not: we witnessed cases where the client has thrown
the flower to the ground and walked away in anger.
Case study 2: Unsuccessful sell
The second scenario shows an instance where the seller was
unsuccessful in selling the flower to a single woman. The start
of the scenario was similar to the previous case. However,
as the woman moved to leave the area, the seller asked her
for money only one second after the flower was accepted.
The woman had attempted a return in polite terms and low
voice α10(0.2,0.4). After the return was declined, the woman
in firm terms but without using expletives ordered the vendor
to take back the flower (α10(0.5,0.6)). At this point the vendor
accepted the return (α12).
TS α1−−→ S1 α4−−→ S3 α5−−→ S4 α7−−→ S7 α13(1)−−−−→ S7 α14−−→ S8
α10(0.2,0.4)−−−−−−−→ S9 α11−−→ S8 α10(0.5,0.6)−−−−−−−→ S9 α12−−→ TN2
Figure 5-a, b and c shows the evolution of the CBs,
the client’s politeness and dignity and the seller’s politeness
and dignity respectively. To avoid unnecessary repetitions we
will concentrate on the differences from the successful sell
scenario. The first observation is that the client being a single
woman, the spouse-perspective values are not present in the
client’s evaluation.
In the CBs the main difference is that as the seller was in a
rush to ask for money, the asking for money α14 happens at
a much lower value of CB(S,Q-Agreed,Crowd, Client).
With regards to the CSSMs, both participants end up
with a lower dignity. The politeness, however, is relatively
unaffected: the client does not use very rude words and
gestures (and is protected by the fact that the Q-Agreed
CB is relatively low). The seller looses some politeness by
his first refusal to take back the flower, but recovers in
politeness when it accepts the return. He looses relatively
large measures of dignity by his refusal. The reason for this
is that his estimate of the public belief in an agreement is
the same as the client’s: CB(S,Q-Agreed,Crowd,Seller)
= CB(S,Q-Agreed,Crowd,Client). This means that in his
estimate, the crowd is more likely to see this as a forced
transaction by a crooked seller, which would make his refusal
have a larger impact. Overall, the seller finishes the scenario
with acceptable values of dignity and politeness. On the other
hand, he did not make a profit and wasted time.
From an explanatory and predictive perspective the question
we must ask is why the seller gives up in this particular
scenario, and whether it was possible to predict this outcome.
Again, we will create a “what would have happened” scenario,
where we assume that the seller, instead of giving in, would
have repeatedly declined the return (action α11) in the face
of more and more insistent return efforts from the client. The
client’s and seller’s CSSMs for this hypothetical scenario are
shown in Figures 5-d and 5-e.
What we find in this case is that the seller would suffer a
socially unacceptable decline in public dignity. On the other
hand, the client had only a moderate decrease in the dignity
and politeness during this escalation phase. This explains why
the seller decided to give up the transaction without insisting
further.
From a prediction point of view, after α13 and α14, that
is after the seller asks for money prematurely, we can predict
that the sell will likely fail, because the client can push the
seller into deep public dignity loss while suffering relatively
minor damage to her own politeness and dignity. Again, this
prediction is probabilistic and depends on the willingness of
the client to start the escalation of the return effort - if the
client gives up after the first try, the scam can still succeed.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we described an approach to create a computa-
tional model of social norms based on identifying values that a
certain culture finds desirable. The model quantifies these val-
ues in the form of Culture-Sanctioned Social Metrics (CSSMs)
and sees social norms as the requirement to maximize these
metrics from the perspective of the self, peers and public.
Our model uses action-impact functions (AIFs) to represent
the way actions affect the CSSMs, this being sometimes also
dependent on the concrete beliefs (CSs) of the actors about
specific questions on the social scenario. Beyond the generic
model, we also proposed some specific representation choices
suitable for the handcrafting of the AIFs: the sum of products
of logistic functions form for CSSM AIFs and the Dempster-
Shafer model for CB AIFs. We validated the model by using
it to represent a complex deception scenario and showing that
it can yield non-trivial insights such as the explanation of
apparently irrational human behavior.
We are working in several directions to further improve
the model. We are continuously extending the collection of
modeled cultures and scenarios. To facilitate this, we are
investigating the possibility to replace the handcrafting of the
CSSM and CB AIFs from observations and interviews with
the automated acquisition of them from a small number of
scenarios. This requires the development of new AIF models
possibly based on deep neural networks.
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